Author: tom
Pillar 1 of the AUKUS agreement, signed between America, Australia and the UK, has two elements: (i) Australia acquiring UK-designed nuclear-powered attack submarines and (ii) the rotational basing of US and UK nuclear-powered attack submarines in Australia. The first element will cost up to $368 billion with a timeline for delivery running into the 2040s. Critics of the agreement hold that it abrogates Australia's own strategic autonomy at the expense of a highly risky faith on America's continued hold over the Asia-Pacific and/or a misplaced view of our own interests.
Normative Bases
Opposing the nuclear submarine deal (a core aspect of the AUKUS agreement) does not require taking a strong stance on Australian military strategy, merely a concern for Australia's defence capabilities and a distaste for government waste. If one layers on top a concern with Australia's strategic autonomy, or doubts in America's continued desire and/or capacity to control the Asia-Pacific, there are further reasons to oppose. Those with any kind of Pacifist bent will see even more concerns insofar as the military capabilities acquired under this agreement are markedly offensive rather than defensive and, given the broader context of the agreement, tie Australia's military to America's perceived ambitions to actively suppress China and thereby risk a catastrophic war.
Concerns about Capabilities
According to official sources, the first SSN AUKUS nuclear submarines will not be operational in the Australian Navy until the 2040s,[1] whereas Australia's Collins-class submarines are due to retire in the 2030s. The deal signed by Australia does recognise this gap and therefore also involves an agreement for America to sell Australia 3-5 Virginia-class submarines in the 2030s.[2] However, there is a high level of uncertainty around this aspect of the arrangement due to America's current submarine production rate and the discretion it has under the agreement to simply refuse to sell. Former Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull has been one of the strongest critics of this element of the deal. In his March 2024 Guardian piece, he explains that the current rate of US submarine production is considerably below what it needs to be to meet the US' own strategic requirements, let alone to have extra submarines around to offer Australia. As he sums up the situation:
The Aukus legislation passed by Congress last December specifically states that submarines cannot be sold to Australia unless the president certifies that their sale will not detract from the needs of the US navy. This is stating no more than political common sense; the US will not sell Virginias to Australia unless the US navy avows that it does not need them.
This means that in order to get to that point you have to assume the rate of Virginia-class submarine construction will nearly double over the next four years, the submarine needs of the US navy will not increase and that by the early 2030s the navy will be sufficiently relaxed about the China threat that it is prepared to reduce its own submarine fleet by three and maybe five of its most valuable underwater assets.
[…]
It seems to me the most likely outcomes will be that the Virginias will not be available to Australia because the US navy cannot spare them and the Aukus SSNs will almost certainly be late. This would mean an extended capability gap from the early 2030s when Australia will have a diminishing and then no submarine fleet.
To summarise, the first major capabilities concern is that Australia could experience a severe capabilities gap in the 2030s that is entirely attributable to the uncertain timelines of the AUKUS agreement — timelines which depend on decisions made by other nations with whom we may not even remain fully strategically aligned.
A second major concern about capabilities arises from those Australian military strategists who would prefer Australia's navy orient itself primarily or entirely around a defensive approach (at odds, they argue, with the proper role of these SSN AUKUS subs). This critique has come from a number of eminent strategists such as Hugh White, Emeritus Professor of Strategic Studies at ANU and former Deputy Secretary for Strategy and Intelligence[3]; Sam Roggeveen, Director of the Lowy Institute's International Security Program and author of the influential 2023 book, The Echidna Strategy[4]; Albert Palazzo, adjunct professor at UNSW Canberra and formerly Director of War Studies for the Australian Army[5]; and Peter Briggs, a retired submarine specialist and a past President of the Submarine Institute of Australia.[6] The views of these strategists do not completely align but they share the view that the acquisition of the AUKUS submarines is at odds with a primary military objective of defending our own sovereignty. A shared claim is that having a small number of high-endurance subs (at most 8) is not an optimal choice for defence and implicitly orients our objectives towards long-range patrols and offensive missions. The expense also erases the possibility of scaling out a different approach that is more calibrated for a defensive strategy.
All of these except Palazzo are still advocates for acquiring more submarines of some description (either conventionally powered or nuclear). Palazzo, meanwhile, views crewed submarines as an increasingly outmoded technology that it would be unwise to invest in at all. Either way, they all advocate for the view (at least at time of last writing) that, despite the immense costs that have already been sunk into this project, Australia would still be better off pulling out and pursuing an alternate strategy.
The Strategic Sovereignty Concern / Dying for American Hegemony
Another core line of criticism has been that AUKUS erodes Australia's strategic sovereignty, forcing us into alignment with American strategy into the indefinite future. There are two main strands to this critique:
Deepening our Alliance with the US.
Arguably the biggest erosion of sovereignty comes from the issue that Turnbull has been most critical of, that Australia is essentially reliant on the good graces of America to maintain basic capabilities into the late 2030s. This reliance makes it critical to keep America's favour for as long as Australia pursues this path. With Trump's “America First” agenda now in full swing, this could turn into a very costly, if not humiliating, ritual of continuously signalling subservience and loyalty. Another damaging aspect is the agreement to rotationally base US and UK submarines in Australia. This further entrenches the appearance of Australia as an American vassal. None of this is even to mention Pillar 2 of the AUKUS agreement which is a broader agreement on technology sharing and information exchange that further entrenches the American-Australian alliance.
Many Australians will have no problem with deepening this alliance, even if it means deepening our dependence on the US. But in an uncertain world with American influence seemingly fading in the geopolitical realm, and with many Australians questioning the extent to which we do share values with America, this self-imposed dependency appears to be a huge gamble.
Aligning with US Strategy to Control the Pacific / Suppress China.
As explained in the above section, the very choice to make this acquisition of expensive, long-distance, long-range nuclear submarines seems to entail a set of strategic objectives that go beyond defending Australia's sovereignty and instead fit with an interpretation that our main objective is to assist America in indefinitely blocking China's territorial claims in the South China Sea and any ambitions it has to take Taiwan. No doubt many Australians hold the view that these are noble aims, and that — broadly speaking — Australia has historically shared those aims with other major countries in the region such as Japan and South Korea (and of course with the Philippines, if not Vietnam, given their territorial disputes with China). But there is an open question about whether America will continue to try to assert its control over the Pacific given a number of factors such as (a) China's growing economic influence in the region[7]; (b) China's growing naval strength; and (c) serious question marks over America's continued desire to control the Indo-Pacific region[8]. But even if America does hold onto its naval dominance in the Pacific for the next decade or more, it is unwise for Australia to remain tied to American objectives if it means risking an all out war with China. If, as argued, AUKUS means Australia is committed to standing alongside America in an aggressive campaign against China, then Australia may genuinely be risking its own self-annihilation. If China neutralises American forces, then — given the procurement choices made under AUKUS — Australia has no chance of defending itself alone.
To sum up, the AUKUS submarine deal has the following flaws:
It risks creating a major capabilities gap in the 2030s due to reliance on a non-binding agreement with America to supply the RAN with second-hand Virginia-class nuclear submarines;
The capabilities acquired are at odds with a strategy oriented around the defence of Australia;
It erodes Australian strategic sovereignty and forces indefinite fealty to America despite the numerous major and obvious risks of doing so.
It's notable that many of the criticisms of the AUKUS deal come from eminent strategists who have served at the highest levels of the Australian defence establishment. A post published by ASPI on 1 May 2025 suggests that there is still doubt from within the establishment. This post describes an exercise that was conducted by “leading thinkers and practitioners” in both Canberra and Washington DC to consider how “the Australian Defence Force might rebalance its force structure over the next decade”. Quoting from this post:
Among the six teams, four cancelled the SSN-AUKUS. Notably, all three groups in Canberra chose to drop the program. All four arrived at the decision after much agonising, but they shared many of the misgivings that the AUKUS sceptics have expressed.
They had concerns about British industrial capacity, the daunting complexities of the program, the delivery timetable and the difficulty of operating the class in addition to Collins- and Virginia-class submarines. The Collinses are in service; at least three Virginias are scheduled to precede SSN-AUKUS submarines into Australian service, arriving in the 2030s.
The post goes on to describe that these four teams were still committed to acquiring nuclear submarines but doing so by making more orders from America. Given the strength of Turnbull's concerns about America's industrial capacity, this doesn't seem all that convincing either. But genuine alternatives are still available in the form of the proposals made by Briggs and Palazzo.
White published a long-form critique in Australian Foreign Affairs.
A critical piece by Roggeveen can be found here.
A Guardian article by Palazzo can be found here.
A Guardian article by Briggs can be found here.
Consider, for example, the economic agreements just signed between Vietnam and China, the recent discussions between China and Japan, or the explosion of Chinese vehicles in the Australian market.
See for example Trump's remarks about Taiwan.
Normative Bases:
There are several lines of argument one can make in favour of keeping this pillar of the AUKUS agreement. The most timid defence — and yet likely the most convincing to sceptics — is simply to point out all the costs of leaving the agreement at this late stage. Another line of argument says that, even if one's preferred strategy is fundamentally defensive, the AUKUS SSN subs could be very effective for this purpose — much more so than the critics will admit. Finally, there is the argument — slightly in tension with the previous — that Australia should not orient its strategy entirely around a defensive objective and that, for the sake of the long-term future of Asia-Pacific, Australia is right to have procured an asset that will support America's objectives (along with other nations) of preventing Chinese dominance of the Asia-Pacific. We will litigate each of these arguments in order.
Costs of Leaving the Agreement
It has now been almost 4 years since the agreement was announced and time is running out for Australia to fill the capabilities shortage it will face with the retirement of its Collins-class submarines in the 2030s. Critics like Peter Briggs and Albert Palazzo may think there is just enough time to procure the weaponry that fit their preferred strategies (linked in the Argument For), but they must admit that a dramatic change of course at this late stage represents a major risk — plausibly greater than the concern about American willingness to sell Australia Virginia-class subs in the 2030s.
In addition to the capabilities risk, there will almost certainly be a huge diplomatic and strategic cost to abandoning the submarines deal at this late stage. The fallout from the announcement of AUKUS — and therefore the abandonment of the French submarine agreement — had major negative consequences for our relationship with France, but the longer-term impact has been muted. The equation is quite different when it comes to breaking such an agreement with the US. Given the belligerency of American diplomacy and foreign policy under Trump, and the US' global economic heft, the fallout from abandoning AUKUS could be very severe. In the longer-run, it also risks creating a self-fulfilling prophecy insofar as it will make the US less likely to defend Australia's interests in the Pacific.
The framing of this policy question suggests that it might be possible to give up on Pillar 1 of the AUKUS agreement but keep Pillar 2 in place, the technology-sharing agreement between the three parties. But this seems implausible to say the least. So giving up on the deal now could also risk a major technological cost.
The Advantages of the AUKUS-SSN subs, even in a Defensive Strategy
An article by Professor Peter Dean, Director of Foreign Policy and Defence at the United States Studies Centre, makes the case that the AUKUS-SSN class is superior to conventional submarines along all dimensions, even if one's preferred strategy is defensive:
Conventionally-powered submarines are restricted in range by their diesel fuel tanks. Their ability to maintain stealth is dependent on limited battery life. And to keep those batteries charged, they must come close to the surface to re-charge them by running their diesel engines through a snorkel.
The transition to an SSN capability provides for an exponential increase in speed, manoeuvrability, survivability, and endurance. They are also vastly more lethal, being able to deliver long-range missiles, much deeper magazines and the ability for vertical launch missiles. An SSN’s ability to maintain high speeds over extended periods means they can get from one place to another quickly and provide a broader range of mission profiles, all while remaining submerged and undetected for months on end.
As a Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments report noted in 2013, the enhanced endurance of an SSN over a conventionally-powered boat means that their time on station at key choke points to Australia almost triples.
Submarine sceptics like Palazzo may claim that all of this is irrelevant if, in future, all subs can be discovered by advanced detection systems. But this is currently a minority position.
Preventing China's Rise as the Dominant Regional Power is the Right Thing to Do
An article by Justin Bassi on the ASPI website makes the case that the AUKUS submarines make sense in the context of a strategy to maintain a balance of power in the Asia-Pacific. Bassi focusses his critique on Professor Hugh White's claims that the AUKUS agreement is oriented towards preserving US dominance or supporting the US in a future war. According to Bassi, supporters of the submarine deal don't support “war for the United States but deterrence for an evolving and diverse region. […] The region is not defined by a simple contest between the United States and China. It is comprised of strong democracies such as Japan, India and South Korea, as well as Southeast Asian nations like the Philippines that reject Beijing’s bullying and are putting their security interests ahead of economic convenience." In other words, Bassi agrees that these submarines have major advantages over conventional submarines when it comes to adventuring far beyond Australia's shores, and he takes the view that these advantages will be vital in working with other nations to prevent Chinese dominance over the Asia-Pacific.
Defence, Foreign Policy, National Security
Turnbull's critique of AUKUS, in particular, the reliance on America's desire to sell us Virginia-class submarines in the 2030s
Albert Palazzo's view that Australia need not acquire any submarines or battleships if it instead invests in an advanced detection system plus lots of missiles and drones.
Peter Briggs' view that Australia would be better off going back to French submarines, albeit nuclear ones.
An article by Justin Bassi taking the view that Hugh White's defensive strategy is mistaken.
Peter Dean's argument for the AUKUS SSN procurement, in which he takes the view that these subs are superior even if one prefers a defensive strategy.
ASPI post describing an exercise conducted by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments where multiple teams decided that the SSN AUKUS procurement carried excessive risk.
Roggeveen expressing his overall position on AUKUS (sceptical but not completely hostile).