In July 2023, an independent Review recommended cessation of the MBR program due to escalating costs outweighing its expected benefits. Pursuant to that outcome... the Government committed to instead pursuing targeted amendments to stabilise and improve business registries and uplift ASIC’s capacity to administer them. [page 32]This schedule reverts the law to ensure ASIC remains the primary responsible entity for these registries.
The Bill represents a necessary and pragmatic recalibration of Australia's corporate regulatory infrastructure. By terminating the Modernising Business Registers (MBR) program, the Government is acting on clear evidence that the project's complexity and escalating costs were no longer justifiable [Judgment]. Returning administration to ASIC ensures that the agency with the greatest expertise in corporate oversight retains control over the data essential to its mission.
Furthermore, the enhancements to the Director ID regime are a vital step in combating "illegal phoenix activity," where directors deliberately bankrupt companies to avoid debts before starting anew. Linking these IDs directly to the Companies Register closes a significant loophole in corporate transparency. The Bill also balances this transparency with a sophisticated approach to privacy; by allowing officers to use alternative addresses for service, it protects individuals from potential safety risks associated with the public disclosure of residential addresses [Judgment].
While the intent to improve registry integrity is laudable, this Bill introduces significant regulatory uncertainty through the expansion of ASIC’s discretionary powers. Specifically, the new power to publish or redact information based on a "public interest" test lacks clear, objective boundaries [Judgment]. This creates a risk of inconsistent application, where the availability of corporate data—a cornerstone of market confidence—becomes subject to the subjective weighing of an administrative body rather than clear statutory prescriptions.
Additionally, the Bill continues a concerning trend in Australian corporate law toward the use of strict liability offences for administrative failures. For example, a director’s failure to update an electronic address or provide an alternative address within tight timeframes can trigger criminal liability regardless of intent. We submit that such "low-level offending" [Explanatory Memo page 49] is better handled through civil penalties or remedial notices rather than the blunt instrument of strict liability, which undermines the traditional legal principle that criminal punishment should require a degree of fault or mens rea [Judgment].
2026-05-14
House of Representatives
Before House of Representatives
Unspecified
Treasury
Anti-Corruption, Democratic Institutions, Financial Regulation