Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2025

High-Level Summary

The Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2025 updates Australia’s interception, surveillance and covert‐operations regimes to ensure they operate as intended, preserve fair-trial rights, and align administrative responsibilities with current departmental arrangements.

It amends the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, Surveillance Devices Act 2004 and Crimes Act 1914 to refine disclosure and admissibility of network warrant information, transfer the Communications Access Coordinator role, permit controlled access to stored communications for testing, modernise international production orders, and clarify thresholds for controlled operations in online environments.


Summary

The Bill amends key federal statutes to modernise Australia’s telecommunications and law-enforcement frameworks:

  • Schedule 1 (TIA Act & SD Act): Allows protected network activity warrant information and network activity warrant intercept information to be used, communicated or recorded to satisfy pre-trial and ongoing disclosure obligations and to be admitted in evidence where necessary to ensure a fair trial or to rebut evidence led by the defence.
  • Schedule 2 (TIA Act): Transfers the statutory function of the Communications Access Coordinator from the Attorney-General’s Department to the Department of Home Affairs to reflect current Administrative Arrangements.
  • Schedule 3 (TIA Act): Aligns the framework for development and testing authorisations under section 31A, permitting limited access to stored communications alongside live interception, and subjects all testing data to the stringent use, disclosure and destruction safeguards in Part 2-6 of the TIA Act.
  • Schedule 4 (TIA Act Schedule 1): Replaces “intercepting” with the neutral term “accessing,” and expressly permits prescribed communications providers to comply with international production orders by copying stored communications, ensuring technical neutrality and capturing all practical data-retrieval methods.
  • Schedule 5 (Crimes Act): Clarifies the threshold for authorising and varying controlled operations—requiring satisfaction only as to the direct and reasonably foreseeable consequences of participants’ unlawful conduct—and confirms that dealing with or facilitating access to sexually explicit material in online covert operations targeting offenders does not itself breach the prohibition on sexual offences.

These amendments balance intelligence-collection powers with legal safeguards, modernise technical definitions, and ensure administrative coherence.


Argument For
Normative Bases
  1. Legal Principle [UDHR Article 10]
  2. Pro-Democracy

The Bill reinforces the rule of law by ensuring all relevant network activity warrant information can be disclosed to defendants and their counsel, upholding the right to a fair trial and preventing miscarriages of justice. It strikes a balance between intelligence confidentiality and prosecutorial transparency, thereby strengthening public confidence in criminal proceedings. [Judgment]

By transferring the Communications Access Coordinator role to the department responsible for the TIA Act, the Bill reduces administrative friction and enhances governmental accountability, ensuring clear lines of responsibility and oversight. [Judgment]

Updating the development and testing authorisation framework to include stored communications under strict use, disclosure and destruction rules modernises Australia’s interception capabilities in line with technological advances, enabling law enforcement to innovate responsibly while maintaining robust privacy safeguards. [Judgment]


Argument Against
Normative Bases
  1. Legal Principle [UDHR Article 12]
  2. Value-Neutral / Epistemic Objection

Expanding the use, recording and communication permissions for network activity warrants risks eroding the intelligence-only safeguard that originally justified lower warrants thresholds, potentially leading to routine admission of sensitive intercepts in evidentiary proceedings and chilling future intelligence collection. [Judgment]

Redefining “intercept” to “access” in international production orders and mandating copies of stored communications substantially broadens the data-collection footprint of Australian agencies overseas, raising legal uncertainty for providers and potential conflicts with foreign privacy regimes. [Judgment]

Clarifying controlled-operations thresholds around “direct and reasonably foreseeable consequences” may inadvertently lower oversight barriers, allowing undercover operatives to engage in riskier online activities with insufficient foresight into indirect harms, thereby exposing participants and targets to unpredictable legal and safety consequences. [Judgment]


Date:

2025-08-27

Chamber:

House of Representatives

Status:

Before House of Representatives

Sponsor:

Unspecified

Portfolio:

Home Affairs

Categories:

National Security, Criminal Law Reform

Timeline:
27/08/2025

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