The Strengthening Oversight of the National Intelligence Community Bill 2025 expands and deepens parliamentary and Inspector-General oversight of all ten agencies in Australia’s National Intelligence Community, enhancing accountability while safeguarding operational integrity.
It also modernises technical provisions, clarifies information-sharing and secrecy-offence exemptions, and introduces liability protections for authorised defence cyber operations.
The Bill amends the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986, the Intelligence Services Act 2001, the Office of National Intelligence Act 2018 and the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement Act 2010 to bring the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC) and the intelligence functions of the Australian Federal Police (AFP), AUSTRAC and the Department of Home Affairs under the jurisdiction of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) and the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS). It empowers the PJCIS with own-motion review rights, allows it to request IGIS inquiries, requires annual briefings by the IGIS and Director-General of ONI, and strengthens ties with the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor (INSLM). The Bill also clarifies secrecy-offence exemptions to permit sharing with IGIS officials, aligns PJCIS reporting limits with national security imperatives, and removes ACIC oversight from the PJCLE.
Schedule 2 amends the Archives Act to update ACIC criminal intelligence record-access; Schedule 3 amends the Criminal Code to exempt certain computer-related acts by defence officials from liability; Schedule 4 expands and modernises the INSLM Act to cover all counter-terrorism and national security laws; Schedule 5 contains application and transitional provisions.
Australia’s intelligence and security agencies hold significant covert powers. Robust, independent oversight is essential to maintain public trust and to ensure those powers are exercised lawfully and proportionately. Expanding the IGIS’s remit to all ten NIC agencies closes oversight gaps and guarantees that every intelligence function is subject to the same rigorous scrutiny.
Enhancing the PJCIS’s ability to initiate reviews and to request IGIS or INSLM inquiries strengthens parliamentary accountability without direct political interference in operations. Requiring annual briefings and clarifying information-sharing rules promotes transparency and timely redress of systemic issues, while secrecy-offence exemptions enable whistleblowers to report misconduct safely.
By codifying liability protections for authorised defence cyber operations, the Bill recognises the technical realities of modern defence work, ensuring capable personnel can act without fear of disproportionate legal exposure. Overall, these measures balance Australia’s security needs with preservation of human rights and democratic oversight [Judgment].
While oversight is vital, the Bill imposes complex new reporting and consultation layers on agencies that must act swiftly to counter threats. Each new requirement to consult multiple agency heads, the PJCIS, the INSLM and the IGIS risks delaying sensitive operations and revealing methodologies, potentially endangering sources, tarnishing international partnerships and diminishing Australia’s ability to respond nimbly to emerging risks [Judgment].
The financial cost—over $12 million for IGIS expansion and additional PJCIS resources—diverts funds from frontline intelligence and law-enforcement capabilities. Overlapping jurisdictions between integrity bodies may spawn bureaucratic ping-pong, leaving critical issues unaddressed during hand-offs. A leaner model that strengthens a single independent oversight office could achieve accountability without the inefficiencies of multiple new reporting chains.
2025-07-30
House of Representatives
Before House of Representatives
Unspecified
Attorney-General
National Security, Democratic Institutions