The Defence and Veterans’ Service Commissioner (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2025 establishes a standalone Defence and Veterans’ Service Commissioner Act to create an independent statutory office responsible for monitoring, inquiring into and reporting on systemic issues affecting suicide prevention and wellbeing among serving and ex-serving Australian Defence Force members. It also repeals the existing Part VIIIE of the Defence Act and makes related amendments to the Archives Act 1983 and the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 to ensure a smooth transition.
The Defence and Veterans’ Service Commissioner Bill 2025 repeals and replaces Part VIIIE of the Defence Act 1903, establishing the Defence and Veterans’ Service Commissioner as an independent statutory office-holder and creating the Defence and Veterans’ Service Commission as a listed entity under the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013. It sets out the Commissioner’s functions—including monitoring trends in veteran suicide, inquiring into systemic factors in Commonwealth policies, undertaking inquiries on the Commissioner’s own motion or at the request of the Minister, and reporting publicly to Parliament—alongside coercive information-gathering powers for ‘special inquiries’, secrecy provisions for protected, intelligence and operationally sensitive information, and requirements for draft and final inquiry reports, tabling in Parliament and government responses.
The Defence and Veterans’ Service Commissioner (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2025 repeals Part VIIIE of the Defence Act, inserts provisions in the Archives Act 1983 to preserve non-publication directions, and amends the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 to allow disclosure of intelligence to the new Commission. Schedule 2 provides saving and transitional measures so that actions commenced under the Defence Act continue seamlessly under the new Act. The Government has allocated $44.5 million in operational funding over four years for the Commission.
The Bill implements Recommendation 122 of the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide by creating a permanent, independent oversight body with the legal authority to identify systemic failures in the defence and veteran support system and drive evidence-based reform. Under a clear legislative framework, the Commissioner can monitor trends, compel information for special inquiries and publicly report findings and recommendations to Parliament. This continuous oversight is essential to reduce veteran suicides and improve wellbeing outcomes, thereby maximising overall welfare and minimising harm to those who have served [Judgment].
Establishing the Commissioner as an accountable authority under the PGPA Act guarantees transparent governance, public reporting and mandatory government responses to recommendations. This strengthens democratic institutions by ensuring that systemic failings are not hidden within departmental silos but are brought before Parliament and the public for scrutiny and action. Independent oversight is critical to restoring trust within the veteran community and delivering the Royal Commission’s vision of meaningful reform.
While the objective of reducing veteran suicide is uncontroversial, creating a new standalone Commission duplicates existing oversight functions performed by the Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force, coroners and the Department of Veterans’ Affairs, potentially leading to bureaucratic overlap and inefficiencies. The resources committed—$44.5 million over four years—might be more effectively directed to frontline mental health and counselling services for veterans, which have a more immediate impact on wellbeing [Judgment].
The Bill’s extensive coercive powers and secrecy provisions risk creating a costly, inward-looking agency focused on reports rather than on rapid, flexible support for individuals in crisis. Over time, the compliance and reporting burdens could divert staff and funding away from program delivery and slow down policy implementation. Without tight coordination among existing bodies, this new layer of oversight may delay, rather than accelerate, practical reforms.
2025-11-27
House of Representatives
Before House of Representatives
Unspecified
Prime Minister and Cabinet
Defence, Social Support / Welfare, Democratic Institutions