Schedule 1 – Police Powers and Warrants: This schedule introduces several changes. Part 1 designates Sydney West Airport (SWA) as a 'major airport' for the purposes of the Crimes Act 1914, empowering the Australian Federal Police (AFP) to exercise necessary powers at SWA, bringing AFP powers at SWA in line with all other major airports in Australia [Explanatory Memorandum page 2]. Part 2 clarifies that specific warrants and orders under the Crimes Act can be made electronically and remotely, reflecting modern operational needs and widely used working practices [Explanatory Memorandum page 2, 28]. Part 3 extends the sunset date for network activity warrants, data disruption warrants, account takeover warrants, and related emergency authorisations by three years to 4 September 2029. This Schedule also removes the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission's (ACIC) ability to obtain data disruption warrants, aligning ACIC's role to intelligence rather than disruption [Explanatory Memorandum page 2, 33]. Part 4 ensures Australian Capital Territory (ACT) Policing can continue to access the Commonwealth's pre-charge detention and investigation scheme [Explanatory Memorandum page 2, 39].
Schedule 2 – Amendment of the Criminal Code: Schedule 2 amends the schedule to the Criminal Code Act 1995. Part 1 introduces evidentiary certificates that provide prima facie evidence of continuous possession of drug exhibits from the point of seizure through to forensic analysis. This aims to improve the operation of serious drug offence provisions by streamlining key processes and reducing administrative complexity for uncontested evidence [Explanatory Memorandum page 3, 41]. Part 2 repeals the existing purity-based method for determining drug threshold quantities and replaces it with a mixture-weight approach. The new approach establishes threshold quantities by reference to the total weight of any substance containing a prohibited drug or precursor, removing the need for purity testing. This aligns the Commonwealth framework with state, territory and international practice, improving cooperation and supporting more efficient and effective prosecution of serious drug offences [Explanatory Memorandum page 3, 48].
Schedule 3 – Director of Public Prosecutions: This schedule amends the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (DPP Act). Part 1 enables the Attorney-General to authorise a sufficiently senior person to exercise all powers and functions ordinarily exercised by the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (the Director) in circumstances where the Director has an actual, perceived or potential conflict of interest. This simplifies the process for managing conflicts without the Director needing to take a leave of absence [Explanatory Memorandum page 3, 52]. Part 2 changes the title of ‘Associate Director of Public Prosecutions’ to ‘Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions’, bringing the Commonwealth Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions in line with state and territory offices of public prosecutions [Explanatory Memorandum page 3, 55].
Schedule 4 – Extradition: Schedule 4 amends the Extradition Act 1988. It clarifies aspects of the extradition process and introduces new powers of entry and use of reasonable force for police officers in relation to the execution of arrest warrants under the Extradition Act [Explanatory Memorandum page 3, 61]. It also clarifies that a person who waives their right to contest extradition is to remain in prison until physical surrender to the requesting country or until released by court order, ensuring consistency with equivalent provisions [Explanatory Memorandum page 3, 59].
Schedule 5 – Telecommunications: This schedule amends the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act) to replace references to the ‘Victorian Inspectorate’ with 'Integrity Oversight Victoria' due to the agency's name change. These amendments align the TIA Act with recent amendments to the Integrity Oversight Victoria Act 2011 (Vic) without making any substantive changes to Integrity Oversight Victoria's ability to lawfully receive interception information [Explanatory Memorandum page 4, 67].
The Bill is stated to have no financial impact [Explanatory Memorandum page 4]. The Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights concludes that while measures in Schedules 1, 2, and 4 may limit human rights, these limitations are considered “reasonable, necessary and proportionate” [Explanatory Memorandum page 5, 24].
This Bill enhances the effectiveness and efficiency of Australia's law enforcement and criminal justice systems, which are foundational for maintaining societal order and national security. Many of the proposed amendments streamline processes, update legislative frameworks to reflect modern operational needs, and ensure law enforcement agencies have the necessary tools to combat serious and organised crime [Explanatory Memorandum page 2, 3].
Specifically, listing Sydney West Airport as a 'major airport' for the Crimes Act aligns police powers at this new facility with those at other major airports, essential for protecting national security, public order, and the safety of individuals in a high-risk environment [Explanatory Memorandum page 7]. Allowing electronic and remote applications for search warrants and assistance orders modernises practices, reduces delays, and supports the operational needs of law enforcement without expanding existing powers or altering legislative safeguards [Explanatory Memorandum page 5, 29].
The extension of sunset dates for network activity, data disruption, and account takeover warrants ensures that the AFP retains critical capabilities to prevent, investigate, and prosecute serious cyber-enabled crimes, including terrorism, child exploitation, and drug trafficking, which pose significant threats to public safety and human life [Explanatory Memorandum page 9, 11]. Removing the ACIC's ability to obtain data disruption warrants clarifies its role as an intelligence agency, rather than a disruption agency, which improves clarity and focus within the national security framework and is based on a review recommendation [Explanatory Memorandum page 33].
Amendments to the Criminal Code, particularly the introduction of evidentiary certificates for drug offences and the shift to a mixture-weight approach for drug quantities, will significantly improve the efficiency of serious drug offence prosecutions. This aligns Australia's framework with international and state/territory practices, reducing resource burdens and facilitating cooperation with foreign law enforcement agencies [Explanatory Memorandum page 3, 48]. These changes enhance the ability to hold offenders accountable and disrupt illicit drug markets, thereby promoting public safety [Judgment].
Furthermore, clarifying the Attorney-General's ability to authorise a senior person to act in cases of conflict of interest for the Director of Public Prosecutions streamlines administrative processes, ensuring the continuous and impartial operation of the CDPP [Explanatory Memorandum page 52]. Enhanced police powers for executing extradition warrants, including controlled entry and use of reasonable force, are essential for the safe and effective apprehension of individuals sought by foreign countries for serious offences, upholding Australia's international obligations and contributing to global crime cooperation [Explanatory Memorandum page 19, 24]. These measures collectively reinforce Australia's commitment to robust law enforcement and international legal cooperation, thereby enhancing national prestige [Explanatory Memorandum page 24].
While the Bill aims to enhance law enforcement capabilities, several measures raise concerns regarding potential infringements on human rights, particularly the rights to liberty, privacy, and a fair trial, which are fundamental to a democratic society. The Explanatory Memorandum itself acknowledges that certain measures may limit human rights, arguing they are “reasonable, necessary and proportionate” [Explanatory Memorandum page 5]. However, the proportionality of these limitations should be critically examined.
The extension of sunset dates for network activity, data disruption, and account takeover warrants prolongs powers that permit covert collection of information and intelligence. These warrants significantly intrude on personal privacy, and while safeguards are in place, any extension of such intrusive powers should be viewed with caution in a democratic context [Explanatory Memorandum page 8, 9]. The continued reliance on these broad surveillance powers may discourage legitimate use of online services by individuals concerned about government access to private data, potentially chilling freedom of expression online [Explanatory Memorandum page 12].
New powers for police officers to enter premises and use reasonable force when executing extradition arrest warrants, while argued to be consistent with existing powers, introduce a significant expansion of authority that could lead to arbitrary interference with privacy and potentially excessive use of force. Although safeguards are mentioned, the inherent risks associated with such powers in a democratic society warrant a more restrictive approach [Explanatory Memorandum page 18, 19, 22]. The potential for physical and mental suffering from disproportionate force is a serious concern, even with guidelines in place, as the section states officers “must not use more force, or subject the other person to greater indignity, than is necessary and reasonable to effect the arrest or prevent escape” [Explanatory Memorandum page 19]. The interpretation and application of “necessary and reasonable” can be subjective and difficult to independently verify.
Furthermore, the amendments relating to evidentiary certificates in drug offence prosecutions, while aimed at efficiency, could potentially impact a defendant's right to a fair trial. While the certificates provide prima facie evidence, shifting the burden of proof even partially onto the defendant to rebut such evidence could weaken their ability to contest the prosecution's case, particularly if they lack resources [Explanatory Memorandum page 41, 150]. The mixture-weight approach for drug quantities, while streamlining prosecutions, may also lead to disproportionately severe penalties for individuals possessing mixtures with low pure drug content, as liability is based on total weight [Explanatory Memorandum page 48, 167]. This could lead to outcomes that are not truly reflective of the actual harm caused or the offender's intent [Judgment].
The amendments in Schedule 5, while presented as merely an administrative update of agency names (Victorian Inspectorate to Integrity Oversight Victoria), could subtly broaden the scope or perceived authority of surveillance bodies. Even seemingly minor legislative changes to oversight bodies should be scrutinised to ensure they do not inadvertently weaken accountability or oversight mechanisms [Explanatory Memorandum page 4, 67, Judgment]. The risk of mission creep or unintended consequences, even from administrative changes, warrants careful consideration in a system where public trust in democratic institutions is paramount.
2026-03-11
House of Representatives
Before Senate
Unspecified
Attorney-General
Criminal Law Reform, National Security, Democratic Institutions