To enliven the power, the AUSTRAC CEO must be satisfied that using the high-risk mechanism to provide the service has caused, will cause or is likely to cause, significant harm to either the financial system, the Australian community, or both.This power provides a "flexible, risk-based response to emerging and evolving... risks" [EM page 8]. Schedule 2 updates the definition of "financing of terrorism" to include offences for state sponsors of terrorism, ensuring Australia meets obligations under UN Security Council resolutions. Schedule 3 makes technical adjustments to customer due diligence (CDD) procedures, including:
The primary justification for this Bill is the imperative of protecting the integrity of Australia's financial system from increasingly sophisticated criminal networks. By empowering the AUSTRAC CEO to target "high-risk mechanisms," the state gains a vital tool to suppress emerging threats, such as the use of cryptocurrency ATMs for money laundering, which often outpace traditional legislative cycles. This proactive stance is a necessary component of modern National Security.
Furthermore, the Bill balances executive power with procedural safeguards. The requirement for a 30-day public consultation period and the use of legislative instruments ensure that any restriction is subject to parliamentary oversight through the disallowance process.[1] This aligns with the Rule of Law by ensuring that administrative decisions are transparent, reviewable, and based on objective criteria of "significant harm" and "public interest" [Explanatory Memo page 8]. Technical amendments to customer due diligence also demonstrate a commitment to efficiency by removing unnecessary regulatory burdens that exceed international standards.
Legislative instruments are subject to section 42 of the Legislation Act 2003, allowing either House of Parliament to veto the instrument.
While the intent to combat financial crime is laudable, this Bill grants excessively broad discretionary power to the AUSTRAC CEO, potentially undermining the Rule of Law. The capacity to "prohibit" entire classes of financial services via legislative instrument represents a significant shift of policy-making from Parliament to an unelected official. Of particular concern is the "no-validity" clause in proposed section 77B(5), which stipulates that a failure to comply with mandatory consultation requirements does not actually invalidate the resulting instrument.[1] This effectively renders the "mandatory" consultation a mere suggestion [Judgment].
Additionally, the Bill introduces harsh criminal penalties—up to four years' imprisonment—for breaches of these CEO-mandated restrictions, often under a strict liability framework. Applying strict liability to offences carrying significant custodial sentences is a departure from established legal principles that usually require proof of intent for serious crimes. Such measures pose a threat to Individual Liberty and may have a chilling effect on financial innovation, particularly in the digital assets sector, by creating an unpredictable regulatory environment where legitimate business activities can be criminalized with minimal warning.
See Explanatory Memo page 11, paragraph 24: "failure to comply with the requirements does not invalidate a legislative instrument."
2026-03-12
House of Representatives
Before House of Representatives
Unspecified
Home Affairs
National Security, Financial Regulation, Science / Technology